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Abstract
This paper examines three compliance mechanisms of the Kyoto
Protocol: (i) the restoration rate, (ii) the commitment period reserve
rule,a n d(iii) the suspension mechanism, all potentially constraining
greenhouse gas emissions trading across time and space. The joint
eﬀect of these mechanisms on prices and costs is studied in a two-
period model under various assumptions about the competitiveness
of the permit market and US participation. The analytical results
indicate that the restoration rate can make discounted permit prices
decrease over time. With the commitment period reserve, marginal
costs may not only be lower, but also higher than the permit prices.
The suspension rule will under quite general circumstances not af-
fect prices and costs; only shift non-compliance from future sellers to
future buyers. The numerical results suggest that with imperfect per-
mit markets and non-participation of the US in the Kyoto Protocol in
2010, none of the three rules becomes binding.
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11 Introduction
Addressing emissions of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming,
the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 allows signatories (governments) to comply with
obligations through emissions trading (Art. 17). Rules for governing such
trades were ﬁnally established in the Marrakech Accord of 2001. We focus
on three of the so-called compliance mechanisms:
• Banking excess permits from one commitment period to the next is allowed,
but borrowing is restricted through the restoration rate.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally,
for each ton of CO2 a party exceeds her quota holdings in one period, she
will have deducted 1.3 tons from her endowment of quotas in the consecutive
period, thus restricting intertemporal emissions trading;
• The commitment period reserve rule states that each party shall maintain
a reserve of quotas which should not drop below 90% of the endowment or
100% of the most recently reviewed emissions inventory, whichever is lowest.
Hence, this rule potentially restricts permit export;
• The suspension mechanism prohibits parties that are non-compliant in one
period to sell permits in the next period, until they return to compliance.
These mechanisms deﬁn ew h a ti sa l l o w e d( a n dw h a ti sn o t )i nt e r m so f
emissions trading across time and space and may therefore aﬀect parties that
have the intentions of following the Kyoto rules as assumed here.
Emissions trading has received signiﬁcant attention even before Mont-
gomery [10] proved that such systems could foster cost-eﬀectiveness. Of
particular relevance here is the literature concerning the intertemporal di-
mension of such systems [14], the eﬀect of market power [6], these two issues
in combination [5], and the eﬀect of various rules constraining such trade
spatially [4], [17]. An overview of recent numerical studies on the eﬀect of
strategic behavior by sellers on the carbon price of the Kyoto Protocol is
given in [16].
So far no comprehensive analysis of the compliance mechanisms exists
in the literature. [1], [2], [7], [8] as well as [13], limit their attention to
the commitment period reserve, while [3] only examines the restoration rate.
None of them deals with the suspension rule. Only one paper deals with the
analysis of all three compliance rules [12], though separately.
This study ﬁlls a gap in the existing literature as we examine the joint
eﬀect of the three compliance mechanisms on prices and costs in a dynamic
setting with imperfect permit markets. As our analysis shows market power
is an important element when investigating the eﬀects of these mechanisms.
A dynamic analysis is essential since the compliance rules by design are
intertemporal.
In section 2 we therefore characterize a two-period model where a group
2of Cournot players compete with a competitive fringe in tradeable permits
governed by the three compliance rules. The equilibrium conditions are pro-
vided. Some general results are presented in section 3, while section 4 oﬀers
some simulations. Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
Consider the ﬁnite set I of agents (countries) engaged in an intertempo-
ral agreement to control emissions of greenhouse gases. The agreement is
assumed to last for t ∈ {1,2} discrete commitment periods each of ﬁnite
duration. Agent i is endowed with permits ei
t > 0, chooses emission levels
xi
t > 0 and can purchase allowances yi
t,b e i n gp o s i t i v ef o rap e r m i tb u y e ra n d
negative for a permit seller. Emission permits are homogeneous (within each
period), perfectly divisible, and exchanged in a common market at unit price
pt > 0.
The costs of complying with the agreement stem from the (time-separable)
costs, ci
t(xi
t), associated with keeping emissions down to level xi
t in period t,
and from the purchase of permits, ptyi
t.1 Let ci
t(xi
t) be non-negative, non-
increasing, convex and continuously diﬀerentiable. Since there is a limit to
how much a country would emit in the absence of emissions regulations, it
is clear that ci
t (xi
t)=0for some xi





what is commonly known as agent i’s baseline or business-as-usual emissions
level, and with our assumptions it is clear that ∂ci
t(xi
t)=0for xi
t > b xi
t.2 We
shall assume that ci
t(xi
t) is strictly decreasing, strictly convex and two times
continuously diﬀerentiable for xi
t < b xi
t.
Since choosing emission levels xi
t > b xi
t subtracts nothing from costs, we
assume that all agents prefer b xi
t to xi
t > b xi
t. Potential problems with discon-
tinuities of ∂ci
t(xi
t) at b xi
t are discarded. For convenience, we also assume that
|∂ci
t (0)| is suﬃciently large, so that any optimal xi
t is strictly positive. This
seems reasonable, at least in the case when xi
t a r ee m i s s i o n so fg r e e n h o u s e
gases and i are countries. To have a well-behaved demand function, we also
take it that |∂ci
t (ei
t)| < ∞. Time preferences are common across parties and
expressed through the discount factor δ ∈ (0,1].
On the behavioral side, each agent i ∈ I is either a member of the com-
petitive fringe across both periods, and then we write i ∈ F,o rastrate-
1Note that ci
t(xi
t) is the emission cost function. We will, however, often use the custom-
ary wording emission abatement cost function. Moreover, unless otherwise stated, when
speaking about marginal costs, we mean the negative marginal costs.
2Here and elsewhere, the operator ∂ represents the generalized derivative, occasionally
partial.
3gist (oligopolist or oligopsonist), in which case we write i ∈ S.T h u s I is
t h ed i s j o i n tu n i o no fF, assumed non-empty, and S. The structure of the
game is such that agents i ∈ S simultaneously choose quantities xi
t and yi
t,










t,t=1 ,2, is taken for granted by the fringe who com-






















subject to the market clearing constraints
P
i∈F yi
1 + Y S
1 ≤ 0( p1) (2)
and P
i∈F yi
2 + Y S
2 ≤ 0( δp2). (3)
p1 and δp2 are the Lagrangian multipliers (shadow prices) associated with
(2) and (3) respectively that clear the permit market, thus representing the
inverse demand functions.3 There are of course additional constraints to (1)
that appear in (6) - (10).
The strategic players are assumed to perfectly foresee how their actions




















Thus, p1, δp2 will be positive when the constraints (2) and (3) respectively
become binding, p2 being the undiscounted permit price in period two. Now,
each and every strategic agent i ∈ S, seeks to minimize the costs including
























Before we turn to the speciﬁcc o m p l i a n c er u l e s ,w ed e n o t edi
t as the deposit
of permits from period t to period t +1 .
In the related literature, terms like banking, borrowing, compliance, non-
compliance are closely related. Hence, to remove any possible confusion
3When speaking about the fringe, we shall rely on the word demand of permits even
though they may be net suppliers. Regarding presentation, the attached shadow price
on any constraint appears on the right-hand-side of a constraint that is included in the
optimization problem.
4regarding the terminology used here, we shall rely on the following through-
out the paper.
Deﬁnition 1. For any agent i ∈ I and period t ∈ {1,2}
(i) di
t ≥ 0 ⇔ agent i being banking ⇔ agent i being over-compliant.
(ii) di
t ≤ 0 ⇔ agent i being borrowing ⇔ agent i being non-compliant.
(iii) di
t =0⇔ agent i being in exact compliance.
When (i) and (ii) are strict inequalities, the term strictly is added. ¤
2.1 Compliance Constraints
2.1.1 The Restoration Rate
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) [19], p. 76, parties that are non-compliant in one commitment
period will have a “Deduction from the Party’s assigned amount [endowment]
for the second commitment period of a number of tons equal to 1.3 [denoted
f] times the amount in tons of excess emissions”. Agents may freely bank
emission allowances from one period to the next, without any additional
reward or penalty.
The deposit of permits in period t, therefore amounts to the sum of the
endowment; the permits bought; less the actual emissions in that period; plus
whatever was banked or borrowed from the previous period. Since di
t−1 ≤
fdi
t−1 if a party was banking in the previous period, whereas di
t−1 ≥ fdi
t−1 if














regardless of the sign of di
t−1.
Parties start with blank sheets, that is di
0 =0 . A party that contends with
the terms of the agreement (not cheating) is therefore assumed to clear the
books in the last period, di
2 ≥ 0. For interpretation (and programming) pur-

















2) ≤ 0( µi) (7)
which both should not be violated. We see that the only diﬀerence between
(6) and (7) is that the ﬁr s tp a r ti nt h el a t t e rc o n s t r a i n ti sm u l t i p l i e db yf.
5If a party is banking, the ﬁrst part of the constraints (6) and (7) will be
negative. And when f>1, it is only (6) that will bind. For a borrowing
party however, only (7) will bind. If both constraints bind, the agent is in
exact compliance. If f =1 , the two constraints coincide, which corresponds
t ot h ec a s eo ff r e eb a n k i n ga n db o r r o w i n g .
2.1.2 The Commitment Period Reserve
T h ec o m m i t m e n tp e r i o dr e s e r v er u l el i m i t st h ea m o u n to fp e r m i t sap a r t yc a n
export, as it must keep a speciﬁc number of permits in its national emissions
registers. According to [18], p. 54, “Each Party... shall maintain in its
national registry a commitment period reserve which should not drop below
90 per cent [denoted ke] of the Party’s assigned amount [endowment], ... or
100 per cent [denoted kx] of its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever
is lowest.”
In the climate regime, emission endowments are given for 5-year periods
(starting January 1, 2008). Producing an emission inventory is a cumbersome
process that takes several years. Reviewing it, can add more time. We
take the approach that the emissions of one commitment period (2008-2012)
are not reviewed before the start of the next period, (2013-2017). For the
ﬁrst commitment period, denote b xi
0 as the latest reviewed emission inventory
before the agreement enters into force (taken to be year 2005), that we assume
to be exogenously given.
The following example describes our interpretation of this rule. Say en-
dowments for an agent are 100 units in both periods and that actual emissions
in year 2005 be 70 units. The commitment period reserve rule in period one
then states that this agent must keep the minimum of 90% of 100, or 100%
of 70 in its registers. Since that minimum is 70, this agent is only allowed to
sell 30 units in period one. Assume she does that, and keeps emissions down
t o7 0i nt h a tp e r i o d .I np e r i o dt w os h em u s tt h e nk e e pt h em i n i m u mo f9 0 %
of 100 or 100% of 70 (the emissions in period one) in the commitment period
reserve, thus she can sell 30 units also in period two. However, she may ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to reduce emissions below 70 in period one (say to 65) and bank
these 5 permits to period two. In period two, the constraint is then relaxed
by ﬁve units since her emissions level in period one is 65, not 70, allowing her
to sell 35 units of her endowment in period two, instead of 30. In addition
we take it that she is allowed to sell the 5 units banked from period one to
period two, since these units are not part of her second period endowment.
Given our approach of “delayed review”, the commitment period reserve
rule translates into the following general constraint on the exports of permits:
e
i















6This constraint essentially states that the endowment of permits in period t,
plus any deposits from the previous period net what must be kept in reserve
must be greater or equal to the volume of permits exported. Since di
0 =0 ,






1 ≤ 0( γi) (8)
in period one. Equation (8) simply states that the volume of permits sold
(= −yi
1) should be equal or lower than the endowment minus the commitment
period reserve. Since keei
1,ki
xb xi
0 are constants (8) is a linear constraint. The








1) ≤ 0( σi) (9)
if the (selling) party is banking. We see from (9) that the permits sold in
period two (= −yi
2) should not exceed the endowment in period two plus
whatever she banked from period one, net the commitment period reserve in
period two.
There are several issues that should be noted regarding (9). First, this
constraint only addresses banking parties. What if the agent was borrowing
in the ﬁrst period? As is clear from the suspension rule discussed below, that
question is completely irrelevant since an agent that is borrowing in period
one, is not allowed to sell anything in period two. Thus we can omit the
equivalent constraint to (9) for a borrowing party. Second, it is clear that
(9) is a non-linear constraint, where the non-linearity goes in the “wrong”
direction and thus may destroy the desired convexity in the domain of the
objective function. This may entail problems for existence of equilibrium
solutions in general. Nevertheless, we will keep this constraint in the La-
grangian setup as it is. Third, our approach of delayed review seems to be
valid if it takes 5 years to produce and review an emissions inventory. This
is perhaps a little longer than what is the most realistic.4
2.1.3 The Suspension Rule
Finally, the negotiators of the UNFCCC agreed that a consequence for non-
complying parties would be the “Suspension of the eligibility to make trans-
fers under Article 17 of the Protocol until the party is reinstated in accordance
with section X, paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 [i.e. compliance]” [19], p. 76.
4According to Knut Alfsen (personal communication) who participated in reviewing
an emissions inventory for Canada, this process took about 3 years. What it takes for
e.g. Russia, where the background statistics perhaps have a diﬀerent quality, may be a
diﬀerent issue.
7The interpretation of transfer in this context is selling (not buying). Thus,
a strictly borrowing party is not allowed to sell anything in the subsequent
period. This means that if di
t−1 < 0, then yi
t ≥ 0, yielding the general con-
straint −yi
t max[0,−di
t−1] ≤ 0. In our two-period case this only applies in the
second period since di













] ≤ 0. (10)
(10) is a non-linear complementarity constraint, that cannot be handled as
it is in a Lagrangian setup, and poses additional trouble with respect to
existence of equilibrium. We choose to keep this constraint out of the op-
timization problem (and hence no multiplier is associated to it) but rather
check whether it is violated in an optimal solution. As it turns out, the
constraint is not violated under quite general assumptions (discussed below
Proposition 6) and in none of our numerical cases.
2.2 Equilibrium
Generally speaking, for the strategists, selling permits in one period, will
not only aﬀect the permit price in that period, but also in the other period.







for t,t0 ∈ {1,2}.5
The description of our model is now complete and we are ready for
Deﬁnition 2. (Cournot-Nash equilibrium) The choices ¯ xi
t, ¯ yi
t,i∈ S, t ∈
{1,2} constitute a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, if and only if, ¯ xi
t, ¯ yi
t minimizes
the costs, including transactions, for agent i ∈ S given that the other agents








t, j 6= i, for all i ∈ S.T h a ti s ,¯ xi
t, ¯ yi
t must
be an optimal solution to the problem (5) subject to (6)-(10) for all i ∈ S. ¤
The next questions are evident: Does an equilibrium exist? If so, is it unique?
Does it belong to the interior? With respect to existence, little can be said.
There are at least two reasons for this. Even in the classic one-period model
without the compliance rules, there are problems with existence of an equilib-
rium solution. They originate from the market transactions for the strategic




t, that appear in
their objectives, are not easily detected. Recalling that inverse demand is the
derivative of the reduced function (1), speaking about curvature properties
5For characterization of ∂pt,t0 in the case of quadratic abatement costs, employed in
the numerical simulations, see Appendix 1.
8of the demand function is far from innocuous, and requires looking beyond
the curvature properties of the cost functions for the fringe. Moreover, keep-
ing in mind that yi
t c a nt a k eo nb o t hp o s i t i v ea n dn e g a t i v ev a l u e s ,m a k i n g
reasonable general assumptions that preserves the convexity of the objective
function for the strategists is a challenging task. In addition, the compliance
rules themselves (speciﬁcally, the commitment period reserve rule and the
suspension mechanism) distort the convexity in the domain of the objective
function. Hence, the most desirable properties for existence of a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium (even in the monopoly/monopsony case) are lacking.
Not surprisingly, we shall therefore simply assume the existence of an
interior equilibrium where the ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed and hold

















































i =0 . (14)
However, as shown in Proposition 6 below, it is clear that generally speaking,
equilibrium is not unique.
3R e s u l t s
Before we start the interpretation of the equilibrium conditions, denote M1 ⊆
F as the subset of the fringe not constrained by (8) and let M2 ⊆ F be the
subset not constrained by (9) or (10). Throughout our analysis, assume that
M := M1 ∩ M2 is non-empty. At a ﬁrst glance, this may seem restrictive,
but a suﬃcient (not necessary) condition for this to hold is that there exists
at least one agent i ∈ F that is a permit buyer in equilibrium in both peri-
ods. This seems quite reasonable, and is in fact satisﬁed in all our numerical
simulations. Since permit prices are common for all agents, this construction
simpliﬁes the interpretation of the equilibrium conditions. Before studying
the eﬀect of the compliance mechanisms, we have
Proposition 1. (On the relationship between marginal costs and permit
6Generally speaking if a is a constant, and f(x) is diﬀerentiable, then ∂ (min[a,f(x)]) =






when f(x) 6= a
[0,f0(x)] when f(x)=a.
9prices I). Assume agent i ∈ I is neither constrained by the commitment pe-
riod reserve rule, nor the suspension mechanism, and that permit prices are
strictly increasing in own permit use. Then,
(i) for i ∈ F, negative marginal costs equals permit prices.
(ii) if i ∈ S is a permit buyer in both periods, negative marginal costs are
higher then equilibrium prices in both periods, and
(iii) if i ∈ S is a permit seller in both periods, negative marginal costs are
lower then equilibrium prices in both periods.
Proof. (i) Since γi = σi =0 , this is trivial when comparing (11) with
(13) and (12) with (14).
(ii) By assumption, ∂pt,t0 are strictly positive for all t,t0.M o r e o v e r , w h e n
i is a permit buyer in both periods yi
1,y i
2 > 0. Thus, adding (11) and (13)




2δ > 0 in period one, and adding (12)




2δ > 0 in period two.
(iii) Follows directly from (ii) when yi
1,yi
2 < 0. ¤
Proposition 1 conﬁrms a standard result in imperfect markets: Competi-
tive behavior implies equating marginal costs with price; strategic buyers
raise own costs and reduce demand to keep prices down, whereas strategic
sellers reduce supply, and thus marginal costs, to keep prices up. But what
if a strategic agent is a seller in one period, but a buyer in the other?
Proposition 2. (On the relationship between marginal costs and permit
prices II). When marginal abatement costs are linear for the fringe, then, if
for a strategic agent i ∈ S who is not constrained by (8) - (10) and who is
s t r i c t l yb o r r o w i n gw eh a v et h a tyi
2 = −fyi
1 in equilibrium, then that agent
behaves as being member of the competitive fringe and marginal costs equal
permit prices.
Proof. By comparing (11) with (13) and (12) with (14) for any agent i ∈ S,









2)δ. By making use of the assumption yi
2 = −fyi
1 and the price dif-

































10where R>0. C l e a r l y ,t h i si sn o t h i n ge l s et h a np1 = −∂ci
1(xi




It is straightforward to show that this result also holds in the case of banking
if yi
2 = −yi
1 in equilibrium (simply replace f by 1 and borrowing by banking
in Proposition 2).
From Proposition 2, we see that the agent is trapped. She wants to
drive up the price in the period she is a seller, but this hurts in the period
she is a buyer and the other way around. Thus eﬃciency losses stemming
from market power are eliminated. This can presumably be implemented by
endowing agents in the second period such that yi
2 = −fyi
1 for that agent.
However, if agents can reject endowment propositions, it may not be an easy
task to accomplish in practice if the agent with market power is a seller in
period one.
Finally, if the agent is in exact compliance in equilibrium, it is equivalent
to banking or borrowing not being allowed. Hence there would not be a
conﬂict of interest, and the strategic agent would contribute to driving up
t h ep r i c ei no n ep e r i o da n dd o w ni nt h eo t h e r .
We now turn to the eﬀect of the compliance rules and start with the
restoration rate.
Proposition 3. (On the relationship between prices and the restoration
rate). Assume M non-empty and that for an agent i ∈ M at least one of
(6) and (7) are strictly binding. Then, p1 ∈ [δp2,fδp2].M o r e o v e r ,i fi ∈ M
is strictly banking, then p1 = δp2, whereas if i is strictly borrowing, then
p1 = fδp2.F i n a l l y ,i fp1 ∈ (δp2,fδp2), then i is in exact compliance.
Proof. For i ∈ M we have by deﬁnition, γi = σi =0and that constraint (10)
is not binding. When at least one of (6) and (7) is strictly binding λ
i+µi > 0.
By making use of (13) and (14) we get in general that p1 =
λi+fµi
λi+µi δp2.S i n c e
λi+fµi
λi+µi ∈ [1,f] ⇒ p1 ∈ [δp2,fδp2]. In the case of λ
i =0 , i.e. borrowing,
p1 = fδp2; in the case of banking µi =0 ,t h u sp1 = δp2. Finally in the case
p1 ∈ (δp2,fδp2) ⇒
λi+fµi
λi+µi ∈ (1,f),t h u sλ
i,µ i > 0 and the agent is in exact
compliance. ¤
Note that p1 = fδp2 does not imply that agent i ∈ M is strictly borrow-
ing, it could perfectly well be in exact compliance (similarly in the case of
banking). If f =1 , Proposition 3 is nothing else than the classic result, that
in equilibrium, permit prices rise with the rate of interest.
Moreover, if M contains at least two elements i,j, can, in equilibrium,
11agent i be banking while j be borrowing? This issue is not only an interest-
ing one in itself, but is relevant for the implications of the suspension rule
discussed in connection to Proposition 6.
Proposition 4. (On banking and borrowing with the restoration rate).
If M contains at least two elements i,j, then, if f>1,a g e n ti cannot be
strictly banking while agent j is strictly borrowing.
Proof. From Proposition 3 it follows that if agent i is strictly banking,
p1 = δp2 and if agent j is strictly borrowing, p1 = fδp2.F r o mt h i si tf o l l o w s
that f =1 , a contradiction. ¤
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i si sc l e a r .I fo n ea g e n ti sb a n k i n gw h i l ea n o t h e ri sb o r -
rowing, which is penalized when f>1, both agents could be strictly better
oﬀ if the banking agent transferred some period one permits to the borrowing
agent, who returned some second period permits to the banking agent. How-
ever, in the case when f =1 , the motivation for such a mutually beneﬁcial
exchange disappears and some could be banking while others were borrowing.
Proposition 5. (On the relationship between marginal costs and permit
prices for members of the fringe with the commitment period reserve
rule) Assume kx > 0 and consider i ∈ F. Then, if the commitment period
reserve rules binds in
(i) period one only, then p1 > −∂ci
1(xi
1),a n dp2 = −∂ci
2(xi
2),
(ii) period two only, then p1 ≤− ∂ci
1(xi
1), and p2 > −∂ci
2(xi
2),
(iii) both periods then p1 T −∂ci
1(xi
1) and p2 > −∂ci
2(xi
2).





















2)δ + δp2 − σ
i =0 . (16)
(i) When only (8) binds γi > 0, whereas σi =0 . T h er e s u l tn o wf o l l o w sw h e n
inserting this into respectively (15) and (16).
(ii) Similarly, insert γi =0 , σi > 0 in (15) and (16) respectively. From this, it
is clear that p2 > −∂ci
2(xi
2). Moreover, if keei
2 >k xxi
1 ⇒ ∂ min[keei
2,k xxi
1]=
kx. Hence, (15) amounts to −∂ci
1(xi





1]=0 , and hence −∂ci
1(xi
1) − p1 =0 .
(iii) When γi > 0, σi > 0, we have from (16) that ∂ci
2(xi
2)δ + δp2 = σi > 0.
12Furthermore, from (15) it is clear that ∂ci
1(xi





1)+p1 T 0 whenever γi T kxσi. However, if
keei
2 ≤ kxxi
1, then, again ∂ min[keei
2,k xxi
1]=0 , and ∂ci
1(xi
1)+p1 = γi > 0.
Proposition 5 yields some trivial and some surprising results. On the in-
tuitive side, the period the rule is binding leads to lower marginal costs than
the permit price in that period. The agent wants to sell more permits, but is
not allowed to do so. Less obvious is that the commitment period reserve rule
in the second period may induce a higher marginal cost than permit price
in period one, since reducing emissions beyond where these are equal may
provide the agent with a less stringent constraint in the second period. The
arguments have the same structure in the case when the agent is a strategist,
but then the agent must also account for changes in the permit price by own
actions.
To be able to draw some inferences about the eﬀect of the suspension
mechanism, we ask the following question: Can we determine a unique dis-
tribution of permits across all agents in each period?
Proposition 6. (On the uniqueness of equilibrium in the permit market).







2,i,j ∈ M that belongs to equilibrium. Assume that ˜ d
j
1 < 0 and that
the left hand side of (8) - (10) are strictly negative for i,j ∈ M, thus not
binding. Then there exists a ∆ > 0 l e a d i n gt oad i ﬀerent permit allocation
˙ yi
1 ← ˜ yi
1−∆, ˙ y
j
1 ← ˜ y
j
1+∆, ˙ yi
2 ← ˜ yi
2+f∆ and ˙ y
j
2 ← ˜ y
j
2−f∆ that also belongs
to equilibrium.
Proof. Keep equilibrium emission levels ﬁxed. For any borrowing agent we
know that (7) is binding, thus f (˜ xi
1 − ei
1 − ˜ yi
1)+(˜ xi
2 − ei
2 − ˜ yi
2)=0(equiva-
lently for j). Choose any ∆ > 0 and update the permit allocation according
to the proposition, thus satisfying, f(˜ xi
1−ei
1− (˜ yi
















2 +f∆)) = 0 and ˜ yi
t +˜ y
j
t = ˙ yi
t + ˙ y
j
t,
t =1 ,2. If the new distribution of permits leads to the violation of any of the
constraints (8) - (10) for i,j, simply reallocate permits by using a smaller ∆
until that is no longer the case. The assumption that (8) - (10) are strictly
negative takes care of the existence of a strictly positive ∆. ¤










In Proposition 6 we showed that the distribution of permits in equilibrium
13is not necessarily unique. The same argument follows for the banking case
(simply replace f with 1 in Proposition 6). However, yi seems to be unique.
Only in the case when agents are in exact compliance (µi,λ
i > 0), we are
able to determine a unique distribution of permits across all agents and both
periods.
A more important implication of Proposition 6 is:
Remark 1. (On the suspension rule) With the assumptions of Proposi-
tion 6, then, in a borrowing equilibrium, we can determine the total volume
of non-compliance, but not by how much each country will borrow (similarly
in a banking equilibrium). It follows that the suspension mechanism does not
aﬀect the total volume of non-compliance in a period, nor prices and costs,
it only shifts the individual amounts of non-compliance from the next period
sellers to the next period buyers. ¤
To clarify the implication of the suspension rule, consider a hypothetical
two-agent case of Russia and the EU. Take a borrowing equilibrium, f =1 .3,
and let permit prices be p1 =1 3 0 , thus δp2 =1 0 0 . We ﬁx optimal emissions
levels throughout the example, hence abatement costs are constant. Assume
we have calculated an equilibrium where Russia is selling some permits to the
EU in period two, but both parties were non-compliant by ﬁve units in period
one. In this case, Russia is violating the suspension rule. To surpass that
problem, Russia can buy ﬁve units of period one permits from the EU. This
will add 5×130 = 650 units to her costs. Russia is now in exact compliance
in period one, but the EU has increased her volume of non-compliance to 10
units. The aggregate volume of non-compliance is constant. Since all emis-
sions levels are ﬁxed, Russia is over-compliant in period two by 5×1.3=6 .5
units. So, let Russia now in addition oﬀer 6.5 units of permits in period two
to the EU at the discounted price 100. Would the EU accept this oﬀer? She
has no reason to reject it, since she increased non-compliance in period one
by ﬁve units, and therefore needs 6.5 additional period two units to cover
up for this. Thus, after this permit swap, both parties are equally well oﬀ,
Russia does not violate the suspension rule, and the aggregate volume of
non-compliance in period one remains the same.
For this to be true, it is necessary that the EU is allowed to transfer a
suﬃcient amount of permits to Russia in period one, which can only happen
if such transfer does not make her violate the commitment period reserve
(8). Similarly, Russia must be allowed to sell 6.5 units in period two to the
EU, without violating the commitment period reserve rule in period two (9).
144 Simulation results
To make numerical inferences about the model, we used marginal abate-
ment cost functions supplied by the International Institute of Applied Sys-
tems Analysis, (IIASA) generated from the MERGE model [9], (see also
www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/). MERGE was calibrated to the B2
emissions scenario made for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[11]. The original parties of the Kyoto Protocol are aggregated into ﬁve par-
ties, EEFSU (Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union), OECDE (OECD
Europe), CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), Japan and the US.
The applied version of MERGE only accounted for energy related CO2-
emissions. Values are reported in constant US dollars of 1997. Marginal
abatement cost functions were generated by imposing various levels of carbon
t a x e so nt h em o d e l . O L Sr e g r e s s i o no nt h e s ed a t ai n d i c a t e dag o o dl i n e a r






t < 0,a n dbi








t > b xi
t. The parametrization of the
cost functions are given in Appendix 2.
The emission endowments for the ﬁr s tc o m m i t m e n tp e r i o d ,ei
1, are de-
ﬁned in the Kyoto Protocol as a percentage change, qi, with emissions in
1990 as base-year, xi
b. Hence, the endowment in the ﬁr s tc o m m i t m e n tp e r i o d
are given by, ei
1 =( 1+qi)xi
b. Emissions endowments for the second commit-
ment period have not yet been negotiated. Lacking strong reasons to choose
anything else, we assume that they are identical to the Kyoto targets (mea-
sured in terms of metric tons), that is, ei
2 = ei
1 for all i ∈ I. Endowments
and baseline emissions are presented in Table 1.7
7A word about abbreviations ﬁts here: $ is US dollars; C, carbon; t, tons; M, million;
B, billion and yr, year.
15Table 1. The committed change in emissions compared to 1990-levels, the 1990
emission levels, the permit endowments and the estimated baseline emissions in
years 2005, 2010 and 2015.
Kyoto Emissions Endow- Baseline Emissions








Units % MtC/yr MtC/yr MtC/yr MtC/yr MtC/yr
US -7.0 1345 1251 1681 1820 1914
OECDE -7.9 934 860 998 1039 1072
Japan -6.0 274 258 324 350 352
CANZ -0.7 217 215 284 313 319
EEFSU -1.7 1337 1314 876 899 946
Total -5.1 4107 3898 4163 4420 4604
In the Kyoto Protocol, the following parameterization has been agreed upon:
f =1 .3,k e =1 0 0 % , and kx =9 0 % . The annual interest rate r, is set at
5% since this is consistent with MERGE. As each commitment period in the
Kyoto Protocol is of 5-year duration, the discount factor, δ,i st h e ng i v e nb y
δ =1 /(1 + r)5 =0 .784.
The model was programmed in GAMS, using the MCP solver (see e.g.
[15]). Costs, Ci, that appear in the tables, are the average annual discounted
costs across the 2×5 year commitment periods (even for parties only partic-
ipating in one period) and include market transactions. We ﬁrst investigate
the benchmark model without restrictions on spatial or temporal trade, and
then study the eﬀects of each rule separately, before bringing everything
together. All cases are examined under two market structures, the fully
competitive and the monopoly case. Moreover, since the US announcement
of not ratifying the Protocol is likely to have a signiﬁcant impact on the out-
come of the agreement, we do all scenarios with and without US participation
in the ﬁr s tc o m m i t m e n tp e r i o d .
4.1 The benchmark case
4.1.1 With the US
Without any restrictions on emissions trading (i.e. f =1 , and constraints
(8)-(10) are removed) then, with the US participating in both periods, the
results are as in Table 2.8
8In all proceeding Tables, the discounted permit prices in period one and two are
located in the coordinates Total/∂ci
1 and Total/δ∂ci
2 respectively.
16Table 2. Emissions trading with free compliance, with the US.
Competitive Trading Monopolistic Trading
Permits Marginal Total Permits Marginal Total
Bought Costs Costs Bought Costs Costs
Period 1+2 1 2 1+2 1+2 1 2 1+2
Variable yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci
Units MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr
US 628 120 120 56 538 138 138 61
OECDE 186 120 120 17 155 138 138 19
Japan 119 120 120 9 109 138 138 10
CANZ 68 120 120 8 48 138 138 9
EEFSU -1000 120 120 -54 -850 37 37 -58
Total 0 120 120 37 0 138 138 41
With competitive trading, discounted marginal costs are equal across par-
ties and periods, which requires the borrowing of 83 MtC/yr of period two
permits in aggregate. However, since f =1 , some maybe banking while
others are borrowing. Quite naturally, when the EEFSU exercises market
power, permit prices are higher since she holds back on sales. The total
a m o u n tb o r r o w e di sa p p r o x i m a t e l yt h es a m ea si nt h ec o m p e t i t i v ec a s e .
4.1.2 Without the US
When the US does not participate in the ﬁrst commitment period, the results
a r ea si nT a b l e3 .
Table 3. Emissions trading with free compliance, without the US.
Competitive Trading Monopolistic Trading
Permits Marginal Total Permits Marginal Total
Bought Costs Costs Bought Costs Costs
Period 1+2 1 2 1+2 1+2 1 2 1+2
Variable yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci
Units MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr
US 411 0 78 21 312 0 109 27
OECDE 257 78 78 13 205 109 109 16
Japan 142 78 78 6 125 109 109 8
CANZ 114 78 78 6 80 109 109 8
EEFSU -925 78 78 -33 -721 0 0 -39
Total 0 78 78 13 0 109 109 20
17Without the US, a large buyer has left the market in period one. As a
result, considerable banking (191 MtC/yr in the competitive case and 179
MtC/yr in the monopolistic one) occurs and permit prices drop under both
market conﬁgurations.
4.2 The Restoration Rate
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of the compliance rules, we ﬁrst consider the eﬀect
of the restoration rate (setting f =1 .3). With the US included in the ﬁrst
period, parties have incentives to be non-compliant, i.e. borrowing in period
one. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Emissions trading with the restoration rate, with the US.
Competitive Trading Monopolistic Trading
Permits Marginal Total Permits Marginal Total
Bought Costs Costs Bought Costs Costs
Period 1+2 1 2 1+2 1+2 1 2 1+2
Variable yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci
Units MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr
US 628 141 109 58 535 163 125 63
OECDE 188 141 109 18 158 163 125 20
Japan 119 141 109 10 108 163 125 11
CANZ 66 141 109 8 45 163 125 9
EEFSU -1000 141 109 -56 -847 41 32 -61
Total 0 141 109 38 0 163 125 42
As compared to a situation with free borrowing, the presence of the restora-
tion rate reduces the aggregate volume borrowed from 83MtC/yr to 6MtC/yr.
The additional social cost of this constraint amount to about 1 B$/yr. In
accordance with Proposition 3, the discounted permit price in period two is
l o w e rt h a ni np e r i o do n e ,m o r es p e c i ﬁcally p1 =1 4 1$/tC and δp2 =1 0 9
$/tC. When permit prices fall, parties would like to borrow, but since bor-
rowing is penalized by a factor of 1.3, that will be exactly the extra price for
borrowing. In the non-competitive case, there is still some borrowing and
permit prices rise to p1 = 163 $/tC and δp2 =1 2 5$/tC, but the direction
of the results is the same. In the case of US non-participation in period one,
parties would be banking and the restoration rate has no eﬀect (confer Table
3).
184.3 The Commitment Period Reserve
We now introduce the commitment period reserve rule given in (8) - (9) that
limits the export of permits. We ﬁrst assume free banking and borrowing
to get a clear picture of the eﬀect of this instrument in isolation. Intuition
indicates that EEFSU is the only seller in each period, thus the only potential
candidate to be restricted by this rule. In period one, the rule implies that
the EEFSU should keep the minimum of 90% of her endowment in period
one (= 90%(1314) = 1183 MtC/yr) or 100% of her latest reviewed emissions
inventory (that we take to stem from the year 2005) thus being 100%(876) =
876 MtC/yr (confer Table 1). Thus the term min[keei
1,ki
xb xi
0] in (8) can
simply be replaced by ki
xb xi
0. It is, however, important to keep in mind that
the EEFSU is allowed to have lower emissions than 876 MtC/yr in period
one, if the extra emission permits not used are banked to the next period.
In period two, the EEFSU must keep the minimum of 90% of the endow-
ment in period two (assumed equal to the period one endowment) or 100%
of the emissions level in period one in the commitment period reserve. This
amounts to the minimum of 1183 MtC/yr or 100%(xi
1),f o ri = EEFSU. Since
the baseline emissions for the EEFSU in period one are 899 MtC/yr, the term
min[keei
2,k xxi
1] in (9), can simply be replaced with kxxi
1 when programming.
Hence (9) becomes a linear constraint.
4.3.1 With the US
The implications of this rule in the case when the US participates in both
periods are presented in Table 5.
19Table 5. Emissions trading with the commitment period reserve, with the US.
Competitive Trading Monopolistic Trading
Permits Marginal Total Permits Marginal Total
Bought Costs Costs Bought Costs Costs
Period 1+2 1 2 1+2 1+2 1 2 1+2
Variable yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci
Units MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr
US 626 121 121 56 538 138 138 61
OECDE 185 121 121 17 155 138 138 19
Japan 119 121 121 9 109 138 138 10
CANZ 67 121 121 8 48 138 138 9
EEFSU -996 130 111 -54 -850 37 37 -58
Total 0 121 121 37 0 138 138 41
The results in the competitive case indicate that this constraint becomes
binding for the EEFSU in the second period. More speciﬁcally the EEFSU
will bank permits and constraint (9) binds. The corresponding period one
constraint (8) does not bind. In the second commitment period, the diﬀer-
ence between the permit price δp2 =1 2 0 .7 $/tC and the marginal emission
reduction cost for the EEFSU, δ∂ci
2(xi
2)=1 1 1 .5 $/tC equals the shadow
price of (9), σi.
The marginal value of reducing one unit in period one has therefore two
components. One, it allows for either selling one more permit in period
one, or for banking one extra permit to the second period which both has a
discounted value of 120.7 $/tC. Two, it relaxes the constraint on the export
o fp e r m i t si nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dw i t ho n eu n i t ,w h i c hh a sav a l u eo f120.7 −
111.5=9 .2 $/tC, exactly the value of σi. T h e r e f o r ei ti so p t i m a lf o rt h e
EEFSU to have a higher marginal abatement cost in period one (120.7+9.2=
130.1 $/tC) than the other parties that abate to the level where (negative)
marginal abatement costs equals permit price.
In total, permits amounting to 75 MtC/yr are borrowed from the second
period.9 With monopolistic emissions trading, the EEFSU holds back on
permit exports suﬃciently for the compliance period reserve to no longer
bind.
9Keep in mind that since f =1here, some agents may be banking while others are
borrowing, thus not contradicting Proposition 4.
204.3.2 Without the US
With the commitment period reserve rule, but without the US participation
in the ﬁrst commitment period, this rule does not bind for any party neither
in the competitive nor in the non-competitive case. Hence, the commitment
period reserve only binds in a competitive market when the US participates
in both periods.
4.4 The suspension rule
To study the eﬀect of the suspension rule in isolation, the model was run
with free banking and borrowing, ﬁrst including the US in both periods. In
this case, we found an equilibrium where the EEFSU is in non-compliance in
period one and selling permits in period two, thus violating the suspension
rule. All other agents are buying permits in period two, thus following the
rule. Controlling for the suspension mechanism, we forced the EEFSU to be
compliant in period one (i.e. by adding the constraint xi
1 − ei
1 − yi
1 ≤ 0). In
the new equilibrium, the EEFSU is in exact compliance in period one, but the
shadow price associated with the added constraint is zero. Marginal costs,
permit prices, and total costs are identical for all parties. The suspension rule
therefore does not change the value of the objective function for each agent
in equilibrium, but only restricts the possible set of equilibria. Without
US participation in the ﬁrst period, all parties bank, and obviously, the
suspension rule does not bind.
4.5 All compliance rules in combination
4.5.1 With the US
When we include all compliance rules (the restoration rate, commitment pe-
riod reserve and the suspension rule), and we assume that the US joins in
the ﬁrst period, then, the results are as given in Table 6.
21Table 6. All compliance rules, with the US.
Competitive Trading Monopolistic Trading
Permits Marginal Total Permits Marginal Total
Bought Costs Costs Bought Costs Costs
Period 1+2 1 2 1+2 1+2 1 2 1+2
Variable yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci yi ∂ci
1 δ∂ci
2 Ci
Units MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr MtC/yr $/tC $/tC B$/yr
US 698 146 112 59 615 163 126 63
OECDE 210 146 112 18 183 163 126 20
Japan 135 146 112 10 126 163 126 11
CANZ 71 146 112 8 52 163 126 9
EEFSU -1114 119 106 -57 -975 36 33 -61
Total 0 146 112 39 0 163 126 42
The results indicate that in the competitive case there is borrowing of 5
MtC/yr in aggregate. The discounted permit price is 1.3 times higher in
p e r i o do n et h a ni np e r i o dt w o( p1 =1 4 6 .0 $/tC and δp2 =1 1 2 .3 $/tC).
The EEFSU is constrained by the commitment period reserve rule in both
periods.
In period two, EEFSU abates to the level where marginal abatement
costs are 105.6 $/tC. The diﬀerence between δp2 and the discounted mar-
ginal abatement cost in period two exactly equals the value of the shadow
price of the commitment period reserve constraint in period two (9). This is
taken account for in period one, since constraint (9) actually depends on the
abatement level in period one.
In period one, the shadow price of constraint (8) equals 33.7 $/tC. The
interpretation is as follows. Had that constraint been relaxed by one unit,
EEFSU could have received 146.0 − 119.1=2 6 .9 $/tC from reducing one
ton of emissions and would have been able to sell one additional permit in
period one. Consequently, the constraint in period two, (9), would have been
relaxed marginally since it depends on the emissions level in period one, and
the EEFSU would have been allowed to also sell one other permit in period
two, which has a value of 112.3−105.6=6 .8 $/tC. Thus, the shadow price of
(8) amounts to the sum of these two: 26.9+6.8=3 3 .7 $/tC. However, since
the EEFSU is not allowed to sell more permits in period one, the opportunity
c o s t so fa b a t i n go n em o r eu n i ti np e r i o do n ed o e sn o te q u a lt h ep e r m i tp r i c e
in that period, but equals rather the value of banking one unit (= δp2)p l u s
t h ev a l u eo fr e l a x i n gc o n s t r a i n t( 9 )b yo n eu n i t . T h i si sw h yt h em a r g i n a l
abatement cost in period one for the EEFSU = 112.3 + 6.8 = 119.1 $/tC.
It is interesting to observe that the EEFSU actually is banking in equilib-
22rium, while the others are borrowing even though f 6=1 . This does, however,
not contradict Proposition 4 since the EEFSU in this case is constrained by
(9) thus not attaining membership of M. The EEFSU wants to sell more
permits in period one, in exchange of permits in period two, since the dis-
counted permit price is higher in period one. Other agents are willing to buy
such permits, decreasing the amount borrowed. However, since the EEFSU
is constrained by (8), she cannot sell more period one permits. The fact that
the EEFSU undertakes emissions abatement in period one at a marginal cost
of 119 $/tC even though she can only sell these at the discounted value of 112
$/tC in period two, is to be able to get a more relaxed commitment period
reserve rule in period two. Hence, it is the commitment period reserve rule
that makes it attractive for the EEFSU to strictly bank while the others are
borrowing, not the suspension rule.
In the case when the EEFSU monopolizes permit supply, the total volume
of permits borrowed by all parties now amounts to 7 MtC/yr. The discounted
permit price is 1.3 times higher in period one than in period two (p1 =1 6 3 .2
$/tC and δp2 =1 2 5 .5 $/tC). The EEFSU is constrained by the commitment
period reserve rule only in period one. In contrast to the perfectly competitive
case, the EEFSU does not bank, but borrows. However, by adding the same
constraint as described in section 4.3 to control for the suspension rule, the
EEFSU is in exact compliance in period one without changing the important
characteristics of equilibrium.
Note that the aggregate abatement costs of the agreement across all
agents and periods are 42 B$/yr, less than what it costs for the US alone.
This is of course because most of the costs incurred by the US are not asso-
ciated with any emissions abatement, but represents only a ﬁnancial transfer
to the EEFSU (through the permit market). In fact, the US would be better
oﬀ ﬁnancing the emissions abatement eﬀorts of all parties, rather than going
along with the endowments of the Kyoto Protocol and emissions trading.
4.5.2 Without the US
When the US only enters in the second commitment period, considerable
banking occurs and the commitment period reserve rule is not binding for
any party in any period. Hence, none of the three compliance mechanisms
analyzed in this paper would bind, and the results are identical to the bench-
mark case given in Table 3.
235 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to assess analytically and numerically the impli-
cations of the three compliance mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol
on permit trading in a setting where some agents may have market power.
Our analytical ﬁndings suggest the following:
1. With free banking, but borrowing constrained by the restoration rate,
the development of the permit price from one period to the next is likely
to be somewhere in the range of increasing with the rate of interest and
falling at the discounted restoration rate.
2. The commitment period reserve may make (negative) marginal costs
lower than the permit price, or higher. This is because the (reviewed)
emissions in one period have implications for the level of this constraint
in the next period.
3. The suspension mechanism is neither likely to become binding, nor
likely to aﬀect the total volume of non-compliance, as it may only shift
the borrowing of permits from future sellers to future buyers, at zero
costs.
From our numerical analysis, we conclude that:
1. The restoration rate and the commitment period reserve rule may be
binding only when the US takes part in the ﬁrst period.
2. The restoration rate limits the incentives to borrow permits from future
periods, and contributes to reduce, but not eliminate such borrowing.
3. The commitment period reserve rule is more likely to become binding
when permit trade is competitive than when trade is manipulated by a
large seller. This is so because a strategic seller holds back on permit
export to keep prices up.
4. The suspension rule is not binding in any of the cases examined, re-
gardless of market structure and US participation.
This study has limitations. First, we have neglected issues of carbon
sinks, non-CO2 greenhouse gases and the Clean Development Mechanism.
Moreover, only the perfectly competitive and the monopoly conﬁguration of
the model were considered, neglecting possible market power on the demand
side. In addition, issues of transaction costs and uncertainty were ignored
24and the analysis was limited to two periods. Finally, we only considered
countries that were not cheating, thus in eﬀect being non-compliant in the
last period. Some of the compliance mechanisms are clearly designed with
purposes not considered here.
Nevertheless, given our broad set of assumptions, the paper yields insight
on the impacts of the compliance mechanisms agreed in the Kyoto Protocol
when the setting is a dynamic imperfect market for emission quota.
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26Appendix 1: Diﬀerentiated inverse demand
The diﬀerentiated inverse demand functions, ∂pt,t0 i nt h ec a s ew h e nm a r -
ginal costs are linear, the set M is non-empty and permit prices are strictly
positive, are found by making use of (2)-(7) and (11)-(14).
To summarize, in the case of strict borrowing or strict banking the price
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In the case of exact compliance (i.e. λ

















We see from (17) that the 2×2 matrix ∂pt,t0 t,t0 =1 ,2 is singular when there
is strictly banking or borrowing. This seems to conﬁrm the lack of a unique
permit pattern across agents and periods. In the case when all agents are
in exact compliance, (18), the matrix, is not singular, and a unique permit
pattern is established.
Appendix 2: Parameterization of marginal costs
The values of the marginal cost function parameters, ai
t and bi
t, are pre-
sented in Table 7.
27Table 7. Marginal cost function parameters.






US -1003 0.551 -760 0.397
OECDE -1883 1.813 -1185 1.105
Japan -1727 4.933 -1258 3.574
CANZ -693 2.216 -611 1.914
EEFSU -1410 1.569 -1034 1.093
Units are such that marginal costs, ai
t +bi
txi
t, are measured in terms of $/tC.
28